The End of the Internal Compliance World as We Know It, or An Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law Enforcement? Bounty Hunting Under the Dodd-Frank Act\u27s Whistleblower Provision by Justin Blount & Spencer Markel
Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law
Volume 17, Number 4 2012 Article 4
The End of the Internal Compliance World as
We Know It, or An Enhancement of the
Effectiveness of Securities Law Enforcement?
Bounty Hunting Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s
Whistleblower Provision
Justin Blount∗ Spencer Markel†
∗
†
Copyright c©2012 by the authors. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is produced
by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
The End of the Internal Compliance World as
We Know It, or An Enhancement of the
Effectiveness of Securities Law Enforcement?
Bounty Hunting Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s
Whistleblower Provision∗
Justin Blount and Spencer Markel
Abstract
In the wake of Bernard Madoff’s $65 billion Ponzi scheme and the recent economic crisis
stemming largely from loosely regulated subprime lending and mortgage-backed securities, Pres-
ident Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act on July
21, 2010, signaling loudly and clearly that change is coming to Wall Street. But Wall Street is
not the only one receiving a message. Buried deep within the 2,319 pages of the Dodd-Frank
Act, companies can find Section 922, the whistleblower provision, which provides a bounty for
whistleblowers who report securities violations to the Securities and Exchange Commission.These
bounty provisions and the subsequent rules implementing them have been criticized by many as
ineffective and unnecessarily intrusive on established internal compliance programs. In light of
these criticisms, this Article analyzes the Dodd-Frank bounty program and its likely effect on
corporate internal compliance programs, relying largely upon literature and studies in the areas of
behavioral economics, organizational behavior and business ethics relating to whistleblowing. The
authors argue that rather than undermining internal compliance programs, the Dodd-Frank bounty
program will serve as a much-needed check on poorly administered internal compliance programs
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internal compliance programs that are not adequately policing fraud 
and unethical behavior. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of Bernard Madoff’s $65 billion Ponzi scheme and the 
recent economic crisis stemming largely from loosely regulated 
subprime lending and mortgage-backed securities, President Obama 
signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (“Dodd-Frank”) on July 21, 2010, signaling loudly and clearly that 
change is coming to Wall Street.1 But Wall Street is not the only one 
receiving a message. Buried deep within the 2,319 pages of the Dodd-
Frank Act, companies can find Section 922, the whistleblower 
provision.2 This provision rewards individuals who assist the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in uncovering any securities 
violations.3 Section 922 requires the SEC to pay whistleblowers a cash 
bounty ranging from ten to thirty percent of any “monetary sanctions,”4 
including settlements, in excess of $1 million that the government 
recovers through civil or criminal proceedings as a result of the 
whistleblower’s assistance.5 
Given the enormous size of recent settlements and fines for 
violations of securities laws, the potential payouts under these 
whistleblower provisions can be quite lucrative. One such area of 
securities law that has recently seen some staggering settlements and 
fines is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), an act that 
prohibits bribes to foreign government officials.6 In 2010, for example, 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78o-11); Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2010, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/ 
22regulate.html. 
 2. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(b). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. § 922(a)(4). The term “monetary sanctions” is defined as any of the 
following that are derived from any judicial or administrative action: (1) any monies, 
(penalties, disgorgement, and interest) ordered to be paid; and (2) any monies deposited 
into a disgorgement fund or another fund pursuant to Section 308(b) of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 as a result of such action or any settlement of such action. 
 5. Id. § 922(b)(1). 
 6. Titan Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), 16 n.8, (Nov. 1, 2004), available at 
http://www.secinfo.com/dVut2.11Z1e.htm (In 2004 Titan Corporation was penalized 
$28.5 million); SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 21592, 
2010 SEC LEXIS 2288 (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litr 
eleases/2010/lr21592.htm; SEC Charges KBR and Halliburton for FCPA Violations, 
SEC Press Release No. 2009-23 (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
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FCPA enforcement activity rose to such a high level that fear of FCPA 
liability became ubiquitous in the business community due to record 
levels of enforcement actions, industry-wide investigations, prosecutions 
of individuals and international anti-corruption cooperation.7 The 
dynamic duo, the SEC and Department of Justice (“DOJ”), dwarfed the 
level of enforcement activity from any prior year in the FCPA’s thirty-
three year history.8 Additionally, because of criticism from a perceived 
lack of enforcement in the period preceding the recent financial crisis, 
the SEC has become more aggressive in pursuing enforcement actions 
for traditional securities law violations as well.9 Against this 
background, Dodd-Frank’s guaranteed financial incentives coupled with 
its fortified anti-retaliation provisions will likely turn the heat up for 
both multinational and domestic companies. This potential for a large 
                                                                                                                                         
press/2009/2009-23.htm (stating that a record settlement was reached in 2008 involving 
Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc. and its parent company Halliburton Co. in which both 
companies agreed to pay a $402 million fine to the DOJ as well as $177 million in 
disgorgement of profits to the SEC based on allegations of bribery of Nigerian officials 
over a ten-year period); SEC Charges Baker Hughes with Foreign Bribery and with 
Violating 2001 Commission Cease-and-Desist Order, SEC Press Release No. 2007-77 
(Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-77.htm ($44 
million settlement with Baker Hughes, Inc. in 2007); Siemens AG and Three 
Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to 
Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 15, 2008), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html (In 2008, the DOJ, the 
SEC, and German authorities settled an enforcement action against the German 
electronics and engineering tycoon Siemens AG, along with its subsidiaries located in 
Argentina, Bangladesh, and Venezuela. The criminal fines, penalties, and disgorged 
profits totaled more than $1.6 billion and now constitute the largest settlement in the 
history of the FCPA. The DOJ also assessed a criminal penalty of $448.5 million on 
Siemens AG and $500,000 on the implicated subsidiaries. Additionally, the SEC 
required Siemens AG to disgorge more than $350 million in profits to settle a related 
civil complaint.).     
 7. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE 1–3 (2011), 
available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010YearEndFCP 
AUpdate.pdf; see also Bethany Hengsbach, Proposed Whistleblower Provision Could 
Dramatically Increase FCPA Risk, GOVCON (May 12, 2010), http://www.government 
contractslawblog.com/2010/05/articles/fcpa/proposed-whistleblower-provision-could-
dramatically-increase-fcpa-risk/ (stating that in just the first few months of 2010 alone, 
the government collected $1.2 billion in FCPA sanctions). 
 8. GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER LLP, supra note 7, at 1.  
 9. See Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Pursuing More Cases Tied to Financial Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 20, 2010, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/business 
/21sec.html. 
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financial reward has created in the minds of many compliance 
professionals a fear of widespread and opportunistic whistleblowing. 
These whistleblower provisions and the subsequent rules 
implementing them10 have been criticized by many as ineffective and 
unnecessarily intrusive on established internal compliance programs. 
Some believe that these existing internal compliance programs can be 
quite successful in deterring fraud and should not be undermined.11 In 
light of these criticisms, this Article analyzes the Dodd-Frank bounty 
program and its likely effect on corporate internal compliance programs 
and internal employee reporting. This Article will particularly rely upon 
literature and studies in the areas of behavioral economics, 
organizational behavior and business ethics. Part I briefly outlines 
relevant bounty programs and whistleblower laws to illustrate how the 
Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions are properly engineered to churn 
out tips. Part II reviews the specific structure of these whistleblower 
provisions and eligibility requirements for obtaining a reward. Part III 
discusses the criticisms of these provisions, and specifically how the 
provisions conflict with internal compliance programs. Part III will also 
answer these criticisms and make specific recommendations on how to 
structure and implement internal compliance programs in order to 
maximize internal reporting in light of these whistleblower provisions. 
Finally, Part IV offers concluding remarks. 
                                                                                                                                         
 10. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-64545, 2011 SEC LEXIS 1816 (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter 
Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions]. 
 11. See, e.g., Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank 
Whistleblower Provisions, 6 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 132 (2011); see also 
U.S. Chamber Warns New SEC Whistleblower Rule Will Undermine Corporate 
Compliance Programs, PRESS RELEASES, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMM. (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2011/may/us-chamber-warns-new-sec-whis. 
tleblower-rule-will-undermine-corporate-complia (“In approving this new 
whistleblower rule, the SEC has chosen to put trial lawyer profits ahead of effective 
compliance and corporate governance. This rule will make it harder and slower to 
detect and stop corporate fraud—by undermining the strong compliance systems set up 
under Sarbanes Oxley to ensure companies take whistleblowers seriously. Armed with 
trial lawyers and new large financial incentives to bypass these programs, 
whistleblowers will go straight to the SEC with allegations of wrongdoing and keep 
companies in the dark. This leaves expensive, robust compliance programs collecting 
dust, while violations continue to fester, eroding shareholder value.”) [hereinafter U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COMM.]. 
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I.   THE BOUNTY MODEL 
Understanding how the structure of the Dodd-Frank bounty 
program can significantly increase tips and enforcement actions begins 
with understanding the program’s design and its roots. For more than 
140 years, federal agencies have benefited from bounty programs in 
some form or fashion.12 Under a bounty scheme, a private informant 
may receive a percentage of any penalties the government recovers from 
legal action taken based on the proffered information. Under such 
schemes, the government is essentially partnering up with private 
citizens in enforcing a particular law. 
In spite of the alleged economic efficiencies of bounty programs, 
some believe they create perverse incentives and should be repealed on 
ethical and policy grounds.13 The reasoning is simple—the financial 
incentives of reporting are oftentimes fueled by greed or revenge. This 
situation may result in snitching against fellow associates, employers, 
relatives and even family members.14 Senator Reid of Nevada best 
captured this philosophy during a 1998 congressional debate when he 
labeled the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) whistleblower program a 
“[r]eward for rats.”15 
As noted by Professors Ferziger and Currell, despite the potential 
moral hazards of bounty schemes, they survive for one reason—they 
work.16 The bounty model is a win-win system. These programs allow 
the government to recover billions of dollars annually that it could not 
have recovered otherwise without the information provided by 
informants, and in return, the government agencies pay out millions in 
bounties.17 But not all federal bounty programs are the same, and not all 
programs have achieved the same results. A comparative analysis of 
several bounty and plain-vanilla whistleblower programs demonstrates 
                                                                                                                                         
 12. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 7, 14 Stat. 471, 473 (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 7623 (2006)). 
 13. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S4397 (1998) (statement of Sen. Reid). 
 14. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Ex-Wife Gets $1 Million in Payment over Pequot 
Case, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870. 
3294904575385551259982316.html. 
 15. 144 CONG. REC. S4397 (1998) (statement of Sen. Reid). 
 16. See Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The 
Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1141, 1143. 
 17. See id. 
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why the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision will most likely do what it 
was created to do—generate tips. 
 
A. SHOW ME THE MONEY:  
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
 
The False Claims Act (“FCA”) authorizes private citizens to bring 
qui tam actions18 on behalf of the federal government against any person 
who defrauds the federal government.19 Under the FCA, the government 
has the right to intervene in a qui tam suit.20 If the government 
intervenes, it is primarily responsible for conducting the litigation, but 
the qui tam plaintiff remains a party to the suit.21 The most important 
feature of the FCA is that it entitles the qui tam plaintiff to at least 
fifteen percent and up to thirty percent of any amounts recovered, 
depending on how much the plaintiff contributed to the litigation and 
whether the government intervened.22 
The FCA’s mandatory reward of at least fifteen percent and a 
maximum recovery of up to double that amount plays an integral part in 
the stockpiles of cash handed out to informants each year.23 In 2009 
alone, the United States government obtained $2.4 billion from FCA 
cases, the second-highest recovery amount in history.24 Of that $2.4 
billion, about $2 billion was recovered in lawsuits filed under the FCA’s 
bounty program.25 The whistleblowers received a hefty $255 million in 
                                                                                                                                         
 18. Qui tam is the Latin abbreviation for the Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino 
rege quam pro se ipso,” which means “he who pursues this action on our Lord the 
King’s behalf as well as his own.” 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM 
ACTIONS 1–7 (3d ed. 2007). Qui tam actions have their origins in the courts of Ancient 
Rome. Qui tam actions flourished under the common law and statutes of England 
during the Middle Ages and were transported to the American colonies and later into 
American law. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating 
Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. 
L. REV. 91, 96 n.19 (2007). 
 19. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2006); see also id. § 3730(b)(1) (authorizing qui 
tam actions). 
 20. Id. § 3730(b)(4). 
 21. Id. § 3730(c). 
 22. Id. § 3730(d). 
 23. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Recovers $2.4 
Billion in False Claims Cases in 2009; More than $24 Billion Since 1986, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-civ-
1253.html. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. 
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awards.26 These unparalleled numbers demonstrate that whistleblowers 
will not shy away from huge financial incentives to tattle. 
 
B. A FLURRY OF TIPS: THE IRS’S 2006  
AMENDMENT TO THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 
 
In 2006, Congress amended the IRS whistleblower program to 
strengthen the IRS’s ability to pay rewards to tax whistleblowers.27 
Now, like the FCA-model, the IRS whistleblower provisions require the 
IRS to pay between fifteen and thirty percent28 of collected proceeds in 
disputes where the information substantially contributes to a decision to 
take administrative or judicial action. In order to qualify for a bounty, if 
the action is brought against an individual taxpayer, their gross income 
for any taxable year subject to the action must exceed $200 thousand 
annually.29 Additionally, the total amount collected in the action must 
exceed $2 million.30 
Comparing the tips accrued in 2007 with those accrued in 2008 
shows that the new amendment is fulfilling its intended purpose. In 
2007, the IRS received eighty-three claims alleging a total underreported 
income of $8 billion.31 In 2008, the IRS received 1,890 claims alleging a 
total underreported income of $65 billion.32 Because it takes years under 
the IRS bounty program to issue the bounty, it is difficult to assess how 
the massive influx of tips will affect actual enforcement.33 Despite this 
uncertainty, supporters of the IRS bounty program point to the billions 
of dollars in tax revenue the IRS stands to gain under the program.34 
                                                                                                                                         
 26. See id. 
 27. See generally Tax Relief & Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 
§ 406(d), 120 Stat. 2922, 2958 (codified at I.R.C. § 7623 (2006)). 
 28. I.R.C. § 7623 (b)(1). 
 29. Id. § 7623(b)(5)(A). 
 30. Id. § 7623(b)(5)(B). 
 31. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
DEFICIENCIES EXIST IN THE CONTROL AND TIMELY RESOLUTION OF WHISTLEBLOWER 
CLAIMS 6 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2009reports 
/200930114fr.pdf. 
 32. See id. 
 33. David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blowers Become Investment Option for Hedge 
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/0 
5/20/business/20whistleblower.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. 
 34. See Erika A. Kelton, To Catch a Tax Cheat, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/07/opinion/07iht-edkelton.4.15087010.html. 
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C. MISSING THE MARK:  
       THE INSIDER TRADING ACT 
 
Exploring a bounty program that lacks a mandatory payout 
provision sheds light on how much a guarantee of financial reward can 
influence a whistleblower’s decision. The Insider Trading and Securities 
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (“Insider Trading Act”) authorizes the 
SEC to pay a bounty of up to ten percent of penalties imposed in insider 
trading cases.35 Despite the program’s lifespan of over twenty years, the 
SEC has only paid a meager $159,537 to a total of five claimants.36 In 
explaining these poor statistics, the Inspector General noted that the 
bounty program “is not fundamentally well-designed to be successful.”37  
There are several arguable explanations for the failure of the Insider 
Trading Act’s bounty program. First, with regard to the potential bounty 
payout, the Insider Trading Act’s ten percent cap falls considerably 
below the fifteen to thirty percent reward available under the FCA and 
the IRS plans.38 This decreased financial incentive eliminates or at the 
very least discourages a large class of motivated whistleblowers.39 
Second, the SEC’s ability to limit its rewards to penalties imposed under 
the Insider Trading Act further underscores this reward gap. In 
comparison, the FCA permits a qui tam litigant to recover a share of any 
settlements rather than just penalties imposed.40 Finally, the rewards 
                                                                                                                                         
 35. See generally Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3, 102 Stat. 4677, 4677 (1988) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-1). 
 36. See H. DAVID KOTZ, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY PROGRAM 5 (2010), available at http://www.sec-
oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2010/474.pdf. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See discussion supra Part I.A-B. 
 39. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2002), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
923(b)(2)(b) (2010) (“[T]here shall be paid from amounts imposed as a penalty under 
this section and recovered by the Commission or the Attorney General, such sums, not 
to exceed 10 percent of such amounts . . . to the person or persons who provide 
information leading to the imposition of such penalty.”), with I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) 
(2006) (“If the Secretary proceeds with any administrative or judicial action . . . based 
on information brought to the Secretary’s attention by an individual, such individual 
shall . . . receive as an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30 percent of the 
collected proceeds . . . .”). 
 40. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (amended 2010) (“[T]here shall be paid from 
amounts imposed as a penalty under this section and recovered by the Commission or 
the Attorney General, such sums, not to exceed 10 percent of such amounts, as the 
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under the Insider Trading Act are entirely discretionary with the SEC 
and not subject to judicial review.41 In other words, even in the event of 
a successful prosecution, SEC informants may not receive any portion 
of the recovery.42 The correlation between the absence of a mandatory 
payout provision and a very low number of reported tips is not likely a 
coincidence. 
 
D. SOX’S OLD PROCEDURAL BACKLOG  
AND WEAK PROTECTIONS 
 
The devastating shake in investor confidence from the Enron, Tyco 
and WorldCom scandals inspired the passage of the original Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (“SOX”).43 There are two specific provisions from SOX that 
received the most publicity, Section 302 and Section 404. Section 302 
requires senior management to certify the accuracy of reported financial 
statements, and Section 404 mandates that management and auditors 
maintain and assess adequate internal controls for financial reporting.44 
However, SOX also contained whistleblower provisions which did not 
encompass a bounty reward, but rather sought to encourage 
whistleblowing based solely on an employee’s anti-retaliation cause of 
action.45 
                                                                                                                                         
Commission deems appropriate, to the person or persons who provide information 
leading to the imposition of such penalty.”), with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (“If the 
Government proceeds with an action brought by a person under subsection (b), such 
person shall . . . receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds 
of the action or settlement of the claim . . . .”). 
 41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (amended 2010) (noting that the Commission’s 
determination as to an appropriate reward “shall be final and not subject to judicial 
review”). 
 42. See id. 
 43. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of titles 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 of the U.S.C) [hereinafter SOX]. Dodd-
Frank contains provisions that amend the old SOX whistleblower provisions. See 
generally Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1840 (2010); 
see also JAY P. LECHNER, GREENBERG TAURIG LLP, DODD-FRANK AMENDS SARBANES-
OXLEY AND CREATES NEW WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS 1–2 (2010), available at 
http://www.gtlaw.com/portalresource/lookup/wosid/contentpilot-core-40116922 
/pdfCopy.name=/GTAlert_DoddFrank%20Whistleblower%20Provisions_July2010.pdf
?view=attachment. 
 44. SOX §§ 302, 404. 
 45. Id. § 806. 
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Under SOX, a covered company cannot “discharge, demote, 
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate” against a 
whistleblower who reports covered information to a federal regulatory 
or law enforcement agency, a member or committee of Congress, or the 
employee’s supervisor or such other person within the organization who 
“has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct.”46 If 
a whistleblower suffers retaliation for making a report, Section 806(a) 
gives that employee a retaliation cause of action.47 However, before the 
employee can litigate this claim in court, the employee must first file a 
complaint with the Department of Labor (“DOL”), who then refers it to 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) for 
investigation“”.48 Following the investigation, an administrative law 
judge from the DOL hears the evidence from the investigation and 
renders a decision.49 The employer may immediately stop any action 
upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the employer 
would have taken the action in the absence of the whistleblowing.50 
SOX is telling of a potential whistleblower’s reliance on, and the 
importance of, job security.51 SOX did little to encourage risk-averse 
information holders to blow the whistle on corporate fraud because of 
the lack of effective whistleblower protection and sufficient incentive to 
report. First, SOX’s whistleblower provisions contained no financial 
incentive for a potential informant. Second, the bureaucratic process of 
bringing a retaliation claim often drew cases out over years, severely 
setting back claimants in the meantime.52 Third, the particularly short 
ninety-day statute of limitations on retaliation claims undercut the 
effectiveness of these provisions, as most potential claimants did not 
realize the scope of their rights and how to pursue them in such a short 
period.53 Finally, SOX’s remedies only allowed for “equitable 
                                                                                                                                         
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. § 806(a). 
 48. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
1757, 1761 (2007). 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative 
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1196–97 (2010) (noting that in their study on whistleblower 
incentives, protection from retaliation can be a significant incentive, particularly for 
female whistleblowers). 
 52. See e.g., Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 552, 553 (W.D. 
Va. 2006). 
 53. See Dworkin, supra note 48, at 1763. 
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compensatory damages”54 but neither punitive nor mental anguish 
damages. Overall, these statutory drafting flaws played a substantial role 
in the shamefully low number of cases found in favor of SOX 
claimants.55 
II.   THE DODD-FRANK BOUNTY PROGRAM 
A. A NEW AND IMPROVED STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
The Dodd-Frank bounty program incorporates many of the same 
elements of prior successful bounty programs while resolving most of 
the shortcomings found in other less successful bounty and 
whistleblower programs. Congress modeled the Dodd-Frank Act closely 
after the largely successful IRS whistleblower bounty program.56 Similar 
to the mandatory payout provisions under the FCA and IRS bounty 
programs,57 Section 922 provides a mandatory award for 
whistleblowers. The SEC must pay whistleblowers a minimum of ten 
percent and up to thirty percent of an award from a successful 
prosecution of more than $1 million assessed by the SEC and recovered 
in other “related actions.”58 
In addition to borrowing mandatory payout provisions, Section 922 
also resolves the stifling issues that once plagued the 2002 SOX 
whistleblower provisions in the form of fortified job security for 
                                                                                                                                         
 54. Listed damages include reinstatement with the same seniority, back pay with 
interest, and compensation for any special damages resulting from the discrimination 
including litigation costs, expert witness fees and reasonable attorney fees. See 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2) (2010). 
 55. See Beverley Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower 
Protection under Sarbanes Oxley: A Proposal for Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 20–38 
(2007). Professors Earle and Madek report that through May 2006, of the 677 
completed Sarbanes Oxley complaints, 499 were dismissed and ninty-five were 
withdrawn. Of the cases that went to an administrative law judge, only six (two percent) 
of the 286 resulted in a decision for the employee. 
 56. See COMM. BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, THE RESTORING AMERICAN 
FINANCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 2010, S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 12 (2010). 
 57. See discussion supra Part I.A-B. 
 58. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 
(2010). “Related Actions” are judicial or administrative actions brought by the DOJ, a 
self-regulatory organization (“SRO”), a state attorney general or another “appropriate 
regulatory authority” that are based on original information provided by a 
whistleblower that leads to the successful enforcement of an SEC action. 
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whistleblowers.59 Section 922 creates a new private right of action for 
employees who have suffered retaliation because of any lawful act done 
by the whistleblower in providing information to the SEC.60 
Whistleblowers may now bring an action in federal court61 as opposed to 
an administrative court.62 This change overcomes the procedural 
headaches and lengthy waiting periods that once discouraged employees 
from reporting under the old SOX whistleblower provisions. 63 
Furthermore, Section 922 affords employees with the right to a jury 
trial64 rather than just a bench trial or a trial in front of an administrative 
law judge—limits found under the old SOX provisions.65 Section 922 
also further incentivizes employees to take a chance and blow the 
whistle by giving sharper teeth to the remedies section of the program. 
Now, courts can require corporations who retaliate against 
whistleblowers to reinstate the employee and pay double-back pay with 
interest, litigation costs, expert witness fees and reasonable attorney’s 
fees.66 
A qualifying whistleblower receives a minimum bounty of ten 
percent of any monetary sanction of $1 million or higher, ensuring that a 
whistleblower entitled to recovery will receive a substantial award.67 
However, Section 922 places wide discretion in the hands of the SEC to 
award up to three times that amount, considering, among other factors: 
(1) the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower; 
(2) the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower; and (3) the 
programmatic interest of the Commission in deterring violations of the 
relevant securities laws.68 Additionally, whistleblowers have the right to 
                                                                                                                                         
 59. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 60. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(h)(1)(A) (“(i) in providing information to the 
Commission in accordance with the whistleblower incentive section; (ii) in initiating, 
testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or administrative action of the 
Commission based upon or related to such information; or (iii) in making disclosures 
that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . .’” the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . and “‘any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the 
jurisdiction of the [SEC].’”) 
 61. See id. § 922(h). 
 62. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 63. See e.g., Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 552, 553 (W.D. 
Va. 2006). 
 64. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(j). 
 65. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 66. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(h)(1)(C). 
 67. Id. § 922(b)(1)(A).  
 68. Id. § 922(c)(1)(B). 
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be represented by counsel.69 Unlike the Insider Trading Act’s 
whistleblower provisions,70 bounty determinations are subject to review 
in an appropriate federal court of appeals—although the amount of an 
award, as long as it falls between ten and thirty percent, is not 
appealable.71 
The design of the Dodd-Frank bounty program borrows the 
successful aspects of its predecessors while rectifying the significant 
flaws that rendered other programs ineffective. The combination of 
fortified job security and potentially huge cash bounties, reminiscent of 
other similar programs, will undoubtedly catch the eye of thousands of 
potential bounty hunters. All in all, based upon these incentives, the 
program seems destined to pump out a sizable increase in tips.72 Indeed, 
the few months following Dodd-Frank’s passage indicate that the 
program has already begun having its tip-generating effect.73 
                                                                                                                                         
 69. See id. § 922(d)(1). 
 70. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 71. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922(f). 
 72. But see Feldman & Lobel, supra note 51, at 1194-95, 1207. In the study 
conducted by these authors on whistleblowing incentives, their survey results indicated 
a high reward may actually produce a “crowding out effect” that reduces 
whistleblowing when the conduct being reported is particularly morally outrageous. See 
id. at 1194. However, their study does show that both protection and a high reward can 
serve as an incentive to blow the whistle, and point out that a “holier-than-thou effect” 
is displayed in the survey results. See id. at 1207 (“The study, moreover, demonstrates 
that informed policy makers must factor in the possibility that informants may 
underestimate the role of financial incentives in their own decision to report. Whereas 
people perceive others as reporting mainly for money, they tend to perceive their own 
social enforcement actions as more ethically driven.”). 
 73. See Joe Palazzolo, After Dodd-Frank SEC Getting At Least One FCPA Tip A 
Day, WALL ST. J. CORRUPTION CURRENTS BLOG (Sept. 30, 2010, 11:21 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2010/09/30/after-dodd-frank-sec-getting-at-
least-one-fcpa-tip-a-day/ (“The Securities and Exchange Commission has been 
receiving at least one tip a day about potential foreign bribery violations since a 
whistleblower bounty program became law in July. . . . The figure is likely to be 
sobering for international companies that have witnessed an eightfold increase in 
enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act since 2004, and as multi-million 
dollar settlements in such cases have become the norm. . . . Experts also predict the law 
will nudge more companies to self-disclose potential FCPA violations out of fear that a 
whistleblower will do it first, putting the company on bad terms with Justice and the 
SEC.”). 
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B. THE DODD-FRANK BOUNTY PROCESS 
Bounty hunters seeking their pot of gold need not worry too much 
about tricky qualifications under Dodd-Frank, as the SEC has 
promulgated detailed rules setting forth the process for submitting 
information.74 An in-depth discussion of the details of all of the 
qualification procedures of the Dodd-Frank bounty program is beyond 
the scope of this Article, particularly with respect to issues relating to 
attorney/client privileged communications and attorneys acting as 
whistleblowers.  However, a general overview of the requirements 
follows. 
Generally, to qualify for a Dodd-Frank bounty, the whistleblower 
must provide the SEC with “original information.”75 This means that the 
information must be: (1) derived from the independent knowledge or 
independent analysis of a whistleblower; (2) unknown to the 
Commission from any other source; and (3) not exclusively derived 
from an allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a 
governmental report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news 
media.76 “Independent knowledge” must be derived from a non-publicly 
available source.77 However, a claimant may still perform an 
“independent analysis” on publicly available information and still 
provide “original information,” assuming the analysis “reveals 
information that is not generally known to the public.”78 The definition 
of “original information” contains exceptions for information derived 
from attorney/client privileged communications: (1) officers, directors, 
trustees, or partners of an entity who learn of the violation through 
another person or through internal compliance processes; (2) employees 
or other persons associated with a public accounting firm where the 
information is obtained through an engagement as an independent public 
accountant under the securities laws; and (3) information obtained 
through a violation of criminal law.79 
The SEC has promulgated specific forms and procedures for 
whistleblowers to use in submitting information.80 The first is Form 
TCR (for “tip, complaint, or referral”), which sets forth the original 
                                                                                                                                         
 74. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions, supra note 10, at 158-63.  
 75. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a)(3). 
 76. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b) (2012). 
 77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(2). 
 78. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(3). 
 79. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4). 
 80. Id. §§ 240.21F-9 to .21F-10, 249.1800–.1801. 
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information that the whistleblower is submitting.81 The form must be 
signed, and the whistleblower must declare, under penalty of perjury, 
that the information is true and correct to the best of the whistleblower’s 
knowledge and belief.82 The form may be completed anonymously, but 
if so submitted, it must be through counsel, and prior to submission the 
whistleblower must sign the form under penalty of perjury and provide 
it to counsel.83 
If an SEC action results in a monetary sanction that may potentially 
provide an award for a whistleblower, the SEC will publish a “Notice of 
Covered Action” to allow whistleblowers with a prospective claim to 
seek recovery of their award.84 To submit a claim, the whistleblower 
must use Form WB-APP.85 While Form TCR may be submitted 
anonymously, in order to claim an award on Form WB-APP, the 
whistleblower must disclose their identity and verify it in a form 
acceptable to the SEC prior to payment.86 
Section 922 does not contain any difficult obstacles that bounty 
hunters must overcome to qualify for a reward. In fact, the broad and 
encompassing qualifications allow for just about anyone with original 
knowledge, except a limited number of excluded parties,87 to come 
forward and hit the jackpot. This apparent breadth has given rise to 
concerns and criticisms that these whistleblower provisions may result 
in harmful and opportunistic whistleblowing behavior that ultimately 
causes more harm than good. 
 
III.   BYPASSING INTERNAL COMPLIANCE:   
CRITICISMS AND RESPONSE 
 
The whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act have been 
criticized for numerous reasons.88  However, this Article focuses on one 
critique that is commonly asserted—that Dodd-Frank incentivizes 
bypassing costly internal compliance programs and reporting securities 
                                                                                                                                         
 81. Id. § 240.21F-9(a)–(b). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. § 240.21F-9(c). 
 84. Id. § 240.21F-10(a). 
 85. Id. § 240.21F-10(b). 
 86. Id. § 240.21F-10(c). 
 87. Id. § 240.12F-8(c). 
 88. See, e.g., Ebersole, supra note 11, at 135-45. 
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law violations behind the company’s back, and instead directly to the 
SEC to seek an award.89 
 
A. A RACE AGAINST TIME: EXTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWING  
COMPETING AGAINST CORPORATE COMPLIANCE CONTROLS 
 
Many have argued that the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions 
may incentivize employees who uncover securities law violations to 
report them directly to the SEC, thereby bypassing and undermining 
internal compliance reporting mechanisms. This situation would in turn 
threaten compliance efforts by dangling the prospect of a multimillion-
dollar bounty in front of potential whistleblowers.90 This incentive 
structure could culminate in a “race” to the doorstep of the SEC before 
the information is no longer “original.”91 This race includes several 
fierce competitors—other potential whistleblowers who may be privy to 
the same information and of course, the company suspected of the 
wrongdoing. Attorneys and compliance professionals have concerns that 
this race may result in several undesired consequences. 
1. Forcing Companies to Self-Report 
First, the race may alter the dynamics of determining when and if a 
company should self-disclose potential FCPA violations to the 
government.92 Rather than investigating and remediating issues in-house 
before deciding whether they warrant a voluntary disclosure, companies 
may feel forced to self-report when doing so would not normally be 
necessary. They might feel the need to disclose even the smallest 
infractions or rush to self-report issues that they do not yet understand, 
in the hopes of stemming a larger, more invasive government 
investigation or receiving cooperation credit.93 Rather than “driving 
home the message of compliance,” the race will encourage some 
                                                                                                                                         
 89. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMM., supra note 11. 
 90. Obiamaka P. Madubuko & Rick Firestone, New SEC Whistleblower Program 
and Added Disclosure Rules in Dodd-Frank Act: Will These New Regulations Help or 
Hinder FCPA Compliance Efforts? BLOOMBERG L.R. (2010), http://www.mwe.com/in 
fo/pubs/firestone_madubuko_dodd-frank.pdf. 
 91. See id. at 4. 
 92. See Madubuko & Firestone, supra note 90, at 4.  
 93. See id. 
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employees “to work secretly against their companies to first report 
corruption without giving the company a chance to address the issue.”94 
This race to report also runs contrary to the goal outlined in the 
federal sentencing guidelines. Dating back several decades, the federal 
government has encouraged corporations to implement and maintain 
their own internal compliance programs and to voluntarily disclose 
suspected misconduct in exchange for mitigating potentially harsher 
penalties for white-collar crime.95 The current federal sentencing 
guidelines provide robust incentives for corporations to implement 
internal compliance programs and report suspected violations to 
appropriate government regulators.96 In fact, corporate defendants can 
receive credit for having an “effective compliance and ethics program,” 
as well as for self-reporting suspected misconduct while fully 
cooperating with regulatory authorities.97 
The race incentivizes corporations to rush hastily to involve federal 
authorities before other potential whistleblowers beat them to the punch. 
Pressing on corporations is the potential loss of credits that may result 
from a whistleblower getting to the doorstep first. Accordingly, the race 
undermines the goal of the federal sentencing guidelines by encouraging 
self-reporting prior to a thorough internal investigation. Internal 
compliance programs thrive best when they are actually used and not 
overlooked. 
                                                                                                                                         
 94. Id. 
 95. See MICHAEL DIAZ JR. ET AL., DIAZ RUES, ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS, 
Whistle-Blowers, Dodd-Frank and the FCPA: The Perfect ‘Anti-Competitive’ Storm for 
U.S. Businesses, 6 (Jan. 25, 2011), http://documents.jdsupra.com/7062c02d-ac97-49a4-
a7b7-b8ed185e82d2.pdf; see also Michael Goldsmith & Chad W. King, Policing 
Corporate Crime: The Dilemma of Internal Compliance Programs, 50 VAND. L. REV. 
1, 3–4 (1997) (“In recent years, federal and state laws have sought to promote good 
corporate citizenship by encouraging business entities to establish internal compliance 
programs designed to avoid—or at least detect—illicit conduct. The most significant 
impetus toward effective internal corporate policing occurred in 1991, when the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines . . . made the existence of an ‘effective’ internal 
compliance program the sine qua non for receiving leniency upon conviction. As a 
result, corporations nationwide have sought to establish compliance programs that 
qualify for preferred treatment under federal law.”). 
 96. See DIAZ ET AL., supra note 95, at 6; see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 18 
U.S.C. App’x § 8C2.5(f) (2010). 
 97. See DIAZ ET AL., supra note 95, at 6. 
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2. Discouraging Cooperation with Regulatory Authorities 
Second, some argue that this race to report may disincentivize 
whistleblowers from helping their companies cooperate with the 
regulatory authorities. Under Dodd-Frank, the bounty is structured as a 
percentage of a corporation’s total monetary sanction.98 Accordingly, 
facilitating the company’s cooperation with government investigators 
can actually lead to a decrease in the sanctions imposed, thereby 
diminishing the whistleblower’s award in the process.99 A 
whistleblower, therefore, would benefit from a corporation who does not 
receive credits for cooperation with regulatory agencies. 
3. Increased Costs from Flimsy and Frivolous Tips 
Third, the race to report may encourage employees to rush to the 
SEC with unreliable and frivolous claims. Frivolous claims drain 
government and corporate investigative resources and the desire to 
receive an award could also give rise to a “lottery mentality” that 
transforms a company’s own employees into bounty hunters.“”’ Given 
the potential to collect record-setting rewards from a settlement or 
action, bounty hunters may play the odds by eagerly seeking out any 
opportunity to report potential misconduct in hopes of striking gold. 
This “just in case” mindset may lead employees who may not 
understand the elements of a particular securities law violation to report 
information to the SEC on a matter that is not actually a violation of the 
law. For example, many argue that the FCPA, which falls within the 
SEC’s enforcement authority, lacks sufficient clarity and contains many 
ambiguities.100 Additionally, there is little case law interpreting the 
FCPA given that most cases end in settlement.101 Thus, incentivizing 
                                                                                                                                         
 98. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a)(4), (b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010). 
 99. See DIAZ ET AL., supra note 95, at 7. 
 100. Mike Koehler, The Financial Reform Bill’s Whistleblower Provisions and the 
FCPA, FCPAPROFESSOR.BLOGSPOT.COM (July 20, 2010, 12:02 AM), http://fcpaprofes 
sor.blogspot.com/2010/07/financial-reform-bills-whistleblower.html. 
 101. See id. (“Against the backdrop of little substantive FCPA case law, the FCPA 
is enforced based largely on government enforcement agency interpretations that have 
never been accepted by a court. For every FCPA enforcement action alleging conduct 
that all reasonable minds would agree violates the FCPA, there is seemingly three 
FCPA enforcement actions alleging conduct that many reasonable minds question 
whether the conduct even violates the FCPA. Yet, these latter FCPA enforcement 
actions, notwithstanding the dubious and untested legal theories they are based on, are 
routinely settled by companies via a resolution vehicle that does not require the 
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employees to blow the whistle in a complex area of law could result in a 
rash of flimsy and frivolous tips. 
Further, the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection may only 
solidify the probability that meritless tips will reach new heights.102 
Whistleblower protection applies to whistleblowers regardless of 
whether they provide a tip that does not end in an enforcement action.103 
Therefore, a disgruntled employee who fears discipline or termination 
may report false or exaggerated tips to obtain whistleblower insulation 
in an effort to shield him or her from termination.104 Companies will 
likely feel discouraged about pursuing questionable claims due to what 
is at stake with a jury trial in federal court—especially considering the 
formidable remedies105 available to employees. 
 
Based upon these fears, some believe a new era has begun: 
[Where] internal corporate investigations of FCPA violations will 
never be the same, with a bevy of eager, lurking whistle-blowers 
attempting to sponge information from the investigation and then 
recasting, packaging and selling it as “original information” to 
hungry government prosecutors and investigators in order to cash in 
their chips at the Justice Department’s dealer table.106 
B. ANSWERING THE CRITICISMS: THE THREAT OF EXTERNAL 
WHISTLEBLOWING IS A NECESSARY COMPANION TO EFFECTIVE  
INTERNAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
 
The whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank are not perfect, and 
will almost certainly give rise to some problematic and opportunistic 
behavior from potential whistleblowers. No incentive system is free 
                                                                                                                                         
company to admit or deny the SEC’s allegations. Quite simply, a settled SEC FCPA 
enforcement action does not necessarily represent the triumph of the SEC’s legal 
position over the company’s, but rather reflects a risk-based decision primarily 
grounded in issues other than facts and the law. It is simply easier and more cost-
efficient for a company to settle an SEC FCPA enforcement (notwithstanding whatever 
dubious and untested legal theory it is based on) than to participate in long, protracted 
litigation with its principal government regulator.”). 
 102. See DIAZ ET AL., supra note 95, at 4. 
 103. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922(h), 124 Stat. 1376, 1845 (2010); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.21F-2(b) (2011).  
 104. See DIAZ ET AL., supra note 95, at 8. 
 105. See discussion supra Part II. 
 106. DIAZ ET AL., supra note 95, at 8. 
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from the potential for exploitation. However, a review of the academic 
literature on internal compliance programs and whistleblowing provides 
evidence that the concerns of bypassing effective internal compliance 
programs and the dire consequences prophesied are likely overblown. 
Additionally, it is still not at all clear whether internal compliance 
programs are effective in detecting or deterring fraud, particularly large-
scale financial fraud involving upper-level management. Thus, the threat 
of external whistleblowing is a potentially effective method to monitor 
internal compliance programs that are not enforced. By providing 
financial incentives for external whistleblowing in certain cases, the 
Dodd-Frank bounty program provides a much-needed check for the type 
of corporate fraud that is least likely to be reported internally, and 
provides balance to the focus on self-regulation. 
1. Externally Mandated or Incentivized Compliance Programs:  
Effective Self-Regulation or Ineffective Window Dressing? 
The rise of internal compliance programs in the United States as a 
widely accepted means of corporate regulation began at least as early as 
the mid-1980s,107 and perhaps as early as the 1960s.108 Internal 
compliance programs received formal approval with the adoption of the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991 (“OSGs”),109 which 
though modified, are still in use today.110 Through the potential for 
sentencing leniency, these guidelines provide incentives to corporations 
with effective internal compliance and ethics programs.111 The 
centerpiece of these internal compliance programs is typically the 
development, and hopefully implementation, of a formal code of ethics. 
Given that internal compliance programs have experienced broad 
acceptance and adoption in the corporate community for quite some 
                                                                                                                                         
 107. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated 
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 497 (2003) (noting that fifty-five defense 
contractors agreed to adopt ethics codes and internal ethics officers in a bid to fend off 
federal regulators in a defense contracting scandal). 
 108. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and 
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 
1579-82 (1990) (stating the initial catalyst for corporate internal compliance structures 
as the price fixing scandals in the 1960’s involving companies, including General 
Electric, in the heavy electrical equipment industry). 
 109. Krawiec, supra note 107, at 497. 
 110. See supra note 91 & discussion Part III.A. 
 111. See id. 
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time, it would be reasonable to assume that there is significant evidence 
of their efficacy in deterring illegal or unethical behavior. Unfortunately, 
this is not the case.112 Although these programs have been widely 
adopted for years, there is very little empirical evidence to substantiate 
the assumption that they are effective in deterring fraud or illegal 
conduct.113 
In 2003, Professor Krawiec noted the existence of studies 
supporting the effectiveness of internal compliance programs, but also 
pointed out their methodological problems. Professor Krawiec 
demonstrated that they relied upon either self-reporting in surveys or 
hypothetical questions in lab settings, as opposed to studying actual 
employee conduct in real-world settings.114 Additionally, she noted that 
the findings in these studies were contradicted by a large number of 
other studies, which found no significant relationship between internal 
ethics codes implemented in these programs and employee conduct.115 
Little has changed in the intervening years, and in conducting research 
for this Article, the authors found that studies conducted to date still do 
not clearly indicate that internal compliance programs are an effective 
deterrent to fraudulent or illegal conduct.116 
                                                                                                                                         
 112. See Krawiec, supra note 107, at 512–13 (“There has been very little research, 
however, that seeks to determine whether these structures deter illegal conduct. Instead, 
most research on internal compliance structures has focused on the percentage of 
companies using various structures, analysis of the substantive content of ethics and 
conduct codes, employee surveys of their perceptions of their company’s conduct 
codes, and self-reporting of conduct code violations.”). 
 113. Id. at 510–15. 
 114. Id. at 511–15. 
 115. Id. However, she does note that many of these studies also suffer from some of 
the same methodological problems as those finding that compliance programs are 
effective. 
 116. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Decentralized Enforcement in 
Organizations: An Experimental Approach, 2 REG. GOVERNANCE 165, 168 (2008) 
(“There is a dearth of empirical studies that integrate both the institutional and 
behavioral aspects of social enforcement. While there have been significant recent 
developments in the legal protections offered to whistle-blowers, the mechanisms and 
incentive structures under which individual enforcement operates have remained largely 
indecipherable.”); see also David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-
Oxley and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1790 
(2007) (“A recent review of studies on codes of ethics shows that approximately half of 
the studies found that codes were effective in reducing unethical behavior, and half did 
not find a significant relationship. Thus, these studies do not establish clear support for 
whether or not codes of ethics directly reduce unethical behavior.”). 
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In a 2007 study, Professors Kaptein & Schwartz reviewed 79 
empirical studies on the effectiveness of codes of ethics, and found 
mixed results:  35% found that they were effective; 16% found only a 
weak relationship in deterring unethical behavior; 33% found that there 
was no significant relationship; and 14% found mixed results.117 More 
recently, Professor Kaptein conducted a study on whether the existence 
of a code of ethics reduced unethical conduct, and on the effectiveness 
of various aspects of codes of ethics.118 The five dimensions studied 
were: (1) the existence of a code of ethics; (2) the frequency of 
communication activities regarding the code of ethics; (3) the quality of 
said communications; (4) the content of the code of ethics; and (5) the 
embedment of the code into the organization by management.119 By 
evaluating effectiveness across these multiple dimensions, he was able 
to study both the relative importance of each factor and how the factors 
interacted with each other.120 
Professor Kaptein found that the mere presence of a code of ethics 
had very little explanatory value on the absence of unethical behavior.121 
When none of the other independent variables were present, the mere 
presence of a code of ethics had a slight negative relationship to 
unethical behavior.122 However, when the other variables were 
considered, the relationship became insignificant, and in some scenarios, 
even had a positive relationship to occurrences of unethical behavior.123 
The variable that had the biggest positive impact in deterring unethical 
behavior was the positive example set by senior and local management 
who embedded the content of the code into the organization by 
modeling ethical behavior in their own actions.124 The presence of the 
code itself had little to no effect, while the modeling of ethical behavior 
by management did. This leads to the conclusion that the more 
important and effective deterrent to fraud is managers who are ethical 
                                                                                                                                         
 117. Muel Kaptein & Mark Schwartz, The Effectiveness of Business Codes: A 
Critical Examination of Existing Studies and the Development of an Integrated 
Research Model, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 111, 113 (2007). 
 118. Muel Kaptein, Toward Effective Codes: Testing the Relationship with 
Unethical Behavior, 99 J. BUS. ETHICS 233, 234 (2011). 
 119. Id. at 234–37. 
 120. See id. at 238–39. 
 121. Id. at 244. 
 122. Id. at 245. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 247. 
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and enforce ethical standards, and not the mere presence of formal codes 
and compliance programs.  
Additionally, the federal policy of encouraging self-regulation 
through internal compliance programs may actually create a perverse 
incentive for what is often referred to as “cosmetic compliance.” This 
phenomenon involves a situation where an entity sets up formal internal 
compliance controls that are largely ineffective or unenforced, and 
instead act as mere window dressing for the purposes of obtaining 
leniency in case of regulatory enforcement.125 Weaver, Trevino, & 
Cochran have found that ethics and compliance programs motivated by 
external factors only (such as negative media coverage or governmental 
pressure through mechanisms such as the OSGs) often lead to formal 
ethics programs that are easily decoupled from the everyday business 
operations of the company and bear the indicia of cosmetic 
compliance.126 These decoupled compliance programs have formal 
reporting mechanisms and policies, but are not integrated into the 
everyday business affairs of the organization. They have little impact on 
regular business decisions and actions.127 Because they are decoupled 
from the daily operations of the business, these externally driven 
compliance programs are not a priority or concern for upper-level 
management and are thus largely ineffective in establishing ethical and 
compliant behavior in a company.128 
The current government incentivized internal compliance regime 
only effectively addresses the formal processes and mechanisms of 
compliance programs, but does little to address the internal ethical 
norms and culture of the firm.129 Since 2004, the OSGs have required 
that effective compliance programs “promote an organizational culture 
that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with 
                                                                                                                                         
 125. Krawiec, supra note 107, at 492. 
 126. See Gary R. Weaver et al., Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social 
Performance: Management Commitments, External Pressures, and Corporate Ethics 
Practices, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 539, 541, 547 (1999) (“An easily decoupled structure or 
policy provides the appearance of conformity to external expectations while making it 
easy to insulate much of the organization from those expectations. Although the 
structure or policy exists, there is no guarantee that it will regularly interact with other 
organizational policies and functions or that employees will be accountable to it.”). 
 127. Id. at 540. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Hess, supra note 116, at 1806. 
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the law” and provide minimum standards for doing so.130 However, 
these minimum standards relate to formal oversight, communication and 
response requirements rather than addressing the more informal 
mechanisms through which culture is built in an organization.131 
Compounding this problem is the fact that it is difficult for a court or 
regulatory body to determine whether an internal compliance program 
has been legitimately implemented and enforced, or if the program was 
in place merely to give the appearance of legitimacy.132 
Effective procedures and processes are certainly important for 
internal compliance programs, and their implementation should be 
encouraged or required by government policy. However, legal 
requirements and government policy are inherently limited in their 
ability to directly affect ethical culture in an organization.133 Formal 
requirements and processes for internal compliance and ethics programs 
are not in and of themselves sufficient, or even effective, in deterring 
illegal behavior when a company retains a corporate culture that allows 
or encourages corrupt behavior.134 Accordingly, in order for 
whistleblowing to be effective, a balance must be struck between 
corporate self-reporting/internal compliance and the ability for 
whistleblowers to report directly to the government.135 
                                                                                                                                         
 130. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. App’x § 8B2.1(a)(2), (b) (2006). 
 131. Id. § 8B2.1(b); see Peter Verhezen, Giving Voice in a Culture of Silence: From 
a Culture of Compliance to a Culture of Integrity, 96 J. BUS. ETHICS 187, 187–88 
(2010). 
 132. See Krawiec, supra note 107, at 492; see also Donald C. Langevoort, 
Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 113–14 (noting that because of the complex incentive 
structures and behavioral factors that influence implementation of compliance 
programs, it is difficult to find objective indicators for the administrative and judicial 
system to evaluate their effectiveness). 
 133. Hess, supra note 116, at 1806. 
 134. See David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform 
Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 317-18 
(2008) (noting the example of Baker Hughes, Inc., which in 2001 was required as part 
of a cease and desist order to develop internal accounting controls to prevent improper 
bribe payments, but in 2007 was accused again of paying bribes, and in a deferred 
prosecution agreement admitted to paying bribes in Kazakhstan as late as November of 
2003); see also Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing Ethics & Legal Compliance: 
What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 131 (1999) (“In this study, we 
found that specific characteristics of the formal ethics or compliance program matter 
less than broader perceptions of the program’s orientation toward values and ethical 
aspirations.”). 
 135. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 51, at 1157. 
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2. Understanding the Motivations for Whistleblowing 
To evaluate the potential effects of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
provisions on internal reporting, one must also understand why 
employees report (or fail to report) wrongdoing, and specifically when 
an employee is most likely to circumvent internal compliance processes 
and blow the whistle externally. When an employee encounters 
wrongdoing in the workplace, following the formal internal compliance 
process or blowing the whistle externally are not the only options 
available. Employees may sit idly by and do nothing, confront the 
violator directly or report to a manager or supervisor.136 Understanding 
why employees blow the whistle as opposed to taking other available 
actions is difficult because it involves the interaction of internal 
motivations (such as individual employees’ sense of morality, altruism 
or self-interest), as well as organizational and environmental 
considerations (such as ethical culture, internal governance policies, 
organizational environment and regulatory environment).137 Numerous 
factors can play a part in the decision, such as the magnitude of the 
harm, the organizational status of the violator and the level of moral 
outrage at the conduct.138 
The motivations and behaviors of whistleblowers have been 
relatively under-researched.139 Professors Miceli & Near attribute this 
lack of empirical research partially to significant challenges both 
conceptually and methodologically in researching this area.140 For 
example, in order to obtain data on actual whistleblowing events, 
researchers must find individuals with knowledge of unlawful or 
unethical conduct in their company and persuade them to agree to 
identify themselves to the researcher.141 Researchers find it difficult to 
                                                                                                                                         
 136. See Muel Kaptein, From Inaction to External Whistleblowing: The Influence of 
the Ethical Culture of Organizations on Employee Responses to Observed Wrongdoing, 
98 J. BUS. ETHICS 513, 514–15 (2011) (discussing generally the various response that 
employees may have to observed wrongdoing). 
 137. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 116, at 166–69. 
 138. Id. at 175. 
 139. Id. at 168; see also Marcia P. Miceli & Janet P. Near, Standing Up or Standing 
By: What Predicts Blowing the Whistle on Organizational Wrongdoing, 24 RES. 
PERSONNEL & HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. 95, 124 (2005) (“Very little controlled research 
on whistleblowing has been published, particularly in top journals; with more research, 
we might have more new directions to report.”). 
 140. See Miceli & Near, supra note 139, at 125-29. 
 141. Id. at 126. 
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locate these individuals and obtain this data because of the potential 
negative consequences of blowing the whistle. Additionally, the earlier 
studies conducted on the motivations of whistleblowing are of fairly 
limited value, as they focus on individual motivational considerations 
rather than the interaction of internal individual factors with external 
organizational and environmental factors.142 However, there are two 
recent studies on whistleblowing behavior which provide some insight 
into how organizational and governmental factors affect whistleblowing. 
In a 2008 study, Professors Feldman and Lobel simultaneously 
examined numerous factors commonly present in organizations to 
determine their impact on reporting misconduct both internally and 
externally.143 The study was conducted using a survey wherein 
participants answered questions regarding five different scenarios of 
misconduct—theft, financial fraud, environmental misconduct, safety 
violations and harassment.144 The participants answered questions as if 
they were the employee discovering each scenario.145 The questions 
measured various factors surrounding the observed misconduct, such as 
degree of moral outrage, perceived social norms regarding the 
misconduct and the method of reporting selected.146 
The study turned out some noteworthy findings regarding 
whistleblowing. First, internal reporting tends to be used for “less 
important” matters involving lower level employees, such as employee 
theft, rather than more extensive problems, such as environmental 
problems or financial fraud.147 Second, the situation in which the 
subjects were least likely to engage in any type of reporting, whether 
internally or externally, was financial fraud committed by 
management.148 The study concluded that this was because any type of 
reporting in this scenario necessarily requires implicating management, 
and thus employees must be willing to pay a high price to report any 
such conduct.149 Third, the study found that external reporting was 
associated with an escalation of the intensity of illegality of the conduct, 
and the more widespread the illegality was throughout the organization 
                                                                                                                                         
 142. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 116, at 169; see also Marcia P. Miceli et al., Who 
Blows the Whistle and Why?, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 113, 114 (1991). 
 143. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 116, at 169–70. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. Id. at 171. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. at 175. 
1050 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
(particularly with management), the less likely it was to be reported 
internally.150 For example, where employees know or suspect that the 
payment of bribes is commonplace and/or endorsed by upper-level 
management, they will be less likely to report any illicit payments 
through internal compliance channels because of the belief that any such 
reporting would be futile. 
Additionally, this study found that when an organization 
emphasizes internal compliance, it can have a positive effect on the 
willingness of employees to internally report illegal behavior and a 
negative effect on external reporting.151 While this can serve as an 
effective means of policing misconduct when the internal compliance 
program is legitimate, where management is complicit in or otherwise 
benefits from the misconduct, this can lead to management illicitly 
emphasizing internal reporting solely to prevent external discovery of 
the misconduct.152 Professor Langevoort proffers two examples where 
this may be the case.153 First, if society does not sufficiently enforce the 
law by imposing an adequate penalty, it can be more economically 
efficient for a company to allow a certain level of profitable violation.154 
Second, if managers are not held personally liable and their payment 
structure is not properly aligned with the interests of the company, they 
can personally benefit from profitability associated with illegal conduct 
with little or no commensurate penalty.155 
In a more recent study, Feldman and Lobel expanded their research 
to include the consideration of various regulatory incentives, including 
monetary bounties, on whistleblowing.156 This study measured the 
effectiveness of four types of regulatory incentives for whistleblowing: 
(1) protection from retaliation; (2) a legal duty to report; (3) fines for 
failure to report; and (4)  monetary incentives for reporting.157 All 
participants in the study’s survey received the same fact pattern of 
misconduct, and each was asked to predict their own reaction as well as 
                                                                                                                                         
 150. Id. at 181. 
 151. Id. at 175. 
 152. Id. at 180. 
 153. See Langevoort, supra note 132, at 80. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 51, at 1176. 
 157. Id. 
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the reaction of others in light of various combinations of the four 
regulatory incentives listed above.158 
As one would expect, the perceived severity of the misconduct had 
a significant effect on the likelihood to report.159 When the severity of 
the misconduct is perceived as low, external incentives matter much 
more in the motivation to report, because the internal motivation of 
moral outrage is missing.160 For these respondents, offering a large 
monetary reward or imposing a legal duty to report and granting a large 
monetary reward provided a very strong incentive for blowing the 
whistle.161 
However, whenever the internal moral motivation to report was 
high, offering a large monetary award was not as strong of an incentive 
for reporting.162 For these respondents, other external incentives, such as 
a legal duty to report and protection from retaliation, were reported as a 
stronger incentive than a high reward.163 This suggests that there may be 
a limited “crowding out” effect, whereby offering a large monetary 
incentive for whistleblowing is counter-productive because it 
undermines the internal ethical and moral motivations for reporting 
wrongdoing.164 This conclusion recognizes that while people do respond 
to monetary incentives as classic economics predicts, these are not the 
only motivators of human behavior.165 
The study results also showed that the respondents tended to 
undermine the role of money in their own decision to report, while 
believing it would be very influential in others decisions to report.166 
The respondents perceived that the imposition of a legal duty to report 
would be a dominant factor in their own reporting decision.167 However, 
the results showed that in the scenario where a legal duty imposed plus a 
large monetary reward was offered versus the scenario where only a 
                                                                                                                                         
 158. Id. at 1188. 
 159. See id. at 1193–95. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 1180.  
 165. See id. at 1193-95; see also Lawrence M. Friedman, Coming of Age: Law and 
Society Enters an Exclusive Club, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 1, 14 (2005) (“There is 
no question that human beings do react to the carrot and the stick. However, people are 
not blindly mechanical cost-benefit machines . . . .”). 
 166. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 51 at 1199. 
 167. Id. 
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large monetary reward was offered, the legal duty provided only a 
marginal increase in reporting.168 This indicates that there is a tendency 
to underestimate the perceived effect that a monetary reward has on the 
decision to blow the whistle.169 
Overall, the study found that a monetary reward is an important 
incentive for reporting, particularly when the conduct is not perceived as 
being overtly morally offensive.170 The size of the bounty is critical, as 
small monetary awards were not a strong incentive and actually 
decreased the rate of reporting when there was no moral outrage at the 
conduct reported.171 Generally, where the perceived moral outrage of the 
wrongdoing was high, the external incentives for reporting were less 
important. Nonetheless, external monetary incentives still provided an 
increase in reporting in such situations.172 
These studies have their limitations; b oth studies rely upon survey 
data of self-reported reactions to hypothetical factual situations, as 
opposed to analyzing actual examples of whistleblowers reporting 
misconduct.173 Additionally, in order to determine the level of moral 
outrage, the second study relied upon the subjective perception of one 
fact pattern, rather than using multiple fact patterns to obtain a broader 
sample of which violations people found morally offensive.174 The 
second study also relied on hypothetical survey results of when a 
                                                                                                                                         
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. at 1200, 1203 (“In fact, high rewards were highly influential at the 
experimental stage, but those high rewards were ranked as the least influential factors 
when respondents were consciously estimating what factors influenced their own 
decisions to report.”). 
 170. See id. at 1202 (“When the ethical significance attached to the reporting act is 
absent, the level of monetary compensation offered through the regulatory system is 
decisive.”). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. at 1188; see also Feldman & Lobel, supra note 116, at 180–81; see also 
Miceli & Near, supra note 139, at 126–27 (“As we have described in depth 
previously . . . , laboratory and scenario studies, while quite useful for many other 
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 174. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 51, at 1188. 
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respondent would be motivated by a bounty as opposed to individuals 
actually faced with the opportunity to receive a bounty for reporting. 
Therefore, there is a distinct possibility that the respondents 
underestimated the role that a financial incentive could play in people’s 
decisions, as Professors Feldman and Lobel admit.175 Nevertheless, these 
studies are the most thorough and recent empirical studies on 
whistleblowing incentives. When considered together, they provide 
important insights into the potential effect that the bounty provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Act may have on whistleblowing and internal 
compliance programs. 
While internal reporting procedures may be effective in some 
situations, they are not an effective reporting mechanism for all types of 
misconduct. Respondents favored internal reporting in smaller, “less 
important” instances of misconduct, but internal reporting is the least 
likely when management is involved in the misconduct at issue.176 
Additionally, the type of misconduct least likely to be reported at all, 
whether internally or externally, was financial fraud by management.177 
This suggests that for the very type of fraud that the Dodd-Frank Act is 
most concerned with policing,178 management could be incentivized to 
focus on internal reporting not to stop the conduct, but to discourage 
government discovery and intervention.179 Further, this suggests that in 
order to encourage employees to be willing to take the risk of 
implicating management in wrongdoing, additional government 
incentives such as a bounty may be effective in increasing external 
reporting of managerial level financial fraud, which is otherwise 
unlikely to be reported.180 
Despite the potential for underreporting on the effect of financial 
incentives inherent in Feldman and Lobel’s second study,181 it still 
showed that monetary incentives can increase external self-reporting.182 
This is especially the case when the misconduct is not of a particularly 
egregious nature,183 and has important implications for the external 
reporting of financial fraud. Certain types of financial fraud, such as 
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 176. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 116, at 171. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See discussion supra Introduction. 
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violations of accounting standards, are highly technical, and thus not 
inherently morally outrageous, or they exist in a legal grey area where 
the conduct can be argued as legal or moral. 
Additionally, when an organization has created a culture where 
corrupt behavior is acceptable, individual employees can become 
desensitized to the conduct such that it becomes commonplace and no 
longer shocking, despite remaining appalling to those outside the 
situation.184 Much of the financial fraud that occurred in the recent 
financial crisis would fit this description.185 In these situations, fraud 
could be of a significant size and scope and damaging to the economy, 
but unlikely to be reported or dealt with internally.186 The bounty 
provisions of Dodd-Frank provide an economic incentive for external 
reporting of this type of fraud, which has otherwise been difficult to 
uncover until substantial societal harm has already occurred. 
 
2. The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions as a Check  
         on Ineffective Internal Compliance Programs 
 
In light of the above analysis, the bounties provided under Dodd-
Frank appear reasonably tailored to supplement internal reporting, not 
bypass it. Some have proposed that in order to avoid the potential for 
undermining internal compliance and ethics programs, the SEC should 
require whistleblower provisions under Dodd-Frank to first report any 
misconduct through internal compliance channels before reporting to the 
SEC.187 While such a requirement would help preserve internal 
                                                                                                                                         
 184. See Hess, supra note 116, at 1797; see also Hess & Ford, supra note 134, at 
319–325 (explaining how paying bribes can become institutionalized into a culture and 
employees begin to rationalize the behavior such that they become routine and no 
longer cause any moral outrage). 
 185. See, e.g., Wyatt, supra note 9 (discussing the SEC’s intent to pursue additional 
financial fraud cases stemming from the mortgage backed securities created during the 
financial crisis). Given the complex nature of the mortgage backed securities created 
during the financial crisis and their widespread use and acceptance, it is highly doubtful 
that most of the lower level employees involved in their structuring and offering 
understood them completely or understood any fraud that may have been involved in 
their offering. 
 186. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 116, at 171. 
 187. See e.g., Ebersole, supra note 11, at 151; see also Bruce Carton, Pitfalls 
Emerge in Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounty Provision, SECURITIESDOCKET.COM 
(Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/09/09/pitfalls-emerge-in-dodd-
frank-whistleblower-bounty-provision/. 
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reporting, it would also subject employees who are not confident in their 
company’s internal compliance to report through a channel that they 
know or suspect may not be effective or taken seriously.188 The 
whistleblowing process is an emotionally draining one.189 Reporting 
through ineffective internal channels may subject a whistleblower to 
social ostracization or other psychological mistreatment by fellow 
employees and management, which can be extremely demoralizing. The 
final SEC rules strike the appropriate balance between internal and 
external reporting by incentivizing, but not requiring, reporting through 
internal compliance channels.190 
Under the final SEC rules, whistleblowers will still be considered 
for an award even if they first report through internal compliance with 
their employer, and their employer subsequently reports to the SEC.191 
In order to trigger this provision, the whistleblower must also submit the 
information to the SEC on the required forms within 120 days of the 
internal report.192 This provides the company with sufficient time to 
evaluate the claims made by the whistleblower and determine whether to 
inform the whistleblower that no violation has taken place, or self-report 
the violation to the SEC. 
As an additional incentive for whistleblowers to internally report, 
the final rules expressly set forth various factors that the SEC may 
consider in determining the amount of award to a whistleblower.193 
Participation in internal compliance systems, which includes internal 
reporting as well as assisting in internal investigations, may increase a 
whistleblower’s overall award.194 Conversely, the SEC may consider 
any interference with internal compliance channels, including providing 
any materially false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or reports to 
internal compliance, as a factor that may decrease the award given to a 
whistleblower.195 
The required size of the monetary sanction to trigger a bounty also 
serves as a level of protection against bypassing internal compliance. 
The studies discussed above indicate that a small reward is not a 
significant motivator for blowing the whistle, and that for minor matters, 
                                                                                                                                         
 188. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 189. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 51, at 1158–59. 
 190. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-4, .21F-6 (2011). 
 191. See id. § 240.21F-4(c)(3). 
 192. See id. 
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employees prefer to report internally.196 The bounty provisions of Dodd-
Frank are not triggered unless there is a monetary sanction of at least $1 
million.197 Thus, employees will not be motivated to bypass internal 
compliance reporting unless they believe the misconduct is large and 
widespread enough to trigger such a sanction, the very type of fraud that 
is the least likely to be reported internally.198 This floor on the monetary 
sanction not only ensures that the whistleblower will receive a 
substantial reward if a successful action is brought (which is required to 
provide sufficient incentive), but also helps ensure that employees will 
not bypass internal compliance on small matters. The floor allows 
internal compliance programs to maintain an ongoing role of policing 
misconduct and encouraging internal reporting, which cuts off problems 
before they become substantial.  
These final SEC rules, in conjunction with the statutory structure, 
adequately address critiques that the bounty provisions will force 
companies to self-report in order to win the race to report,199 will 
disincentivize cooperation with regulatory authorities200 and incentivize 
frivolous tips to the SEC.201 To the extent that an organization has an 
effective internal compliance program that is embraced and believed in 
by employees, the whistleblowing mechanism in the rules provides an 
incentive for employees to first report internally. It also gives adequate 
time to the organization to determine whether the decision to self-report 
should be made. The opportunity to increase the whistleblower’s share 
of the sanction as their reward202 helps offset the incentive to bypass 
internal reporting in an attempt to increase the size of the sanction. 
Under any whistleblower structure, there will be frivolous tips. 
However, if the organization has a robust compliance process in place, 
in conjunction with a cultural norm of internally reporting and dealing 
with misconduct, organizations have ample opportunity to address the 
merits of a complaint with the employee before it is reported. 
Far from undercutting internal compliance programs, these 
whistleblower provisions provide a check on ineffective internal 
compliance programs. While a court or regulator may not be in the best 
                                                                                                                                         
 196. See discussion supra Part III.B.II. 
 197. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1842 (2010). 
 198. See discussion supra Part III.B.II. 
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position to adequately assess whether an internal compliance program is 
truly effective,203 employees within an organization are uniquely 
positioned to gauge the ethical climate of the organization and determine 
whether reporting internally will be futile or result in affirmative action 
to remedy the problem. The decision to blow the whistle is a complex 
one, and aligning incentives to maximize proper reporting while also 
minimizing frivolous reporting is difficult.204 While experience will tell 
us where these whistleblower provisions fall short (as they undoubtedly 
will in some regard), the final rules drafted by the SEC represent well-
crafted regulations that strike a balance between internal and external 
reporting. By allowing, but not directly incentivizing, employees to 
report directly to the SEC rather than through internal compliance 
structures, these rules provide a measure of much needed accountability 
to corporate internal compliance programs without undercutting them. 
 
C. DEALING WITH DODD-FRANK:   
CREATING AND INCENTIVIZING AN ETHICAL CULTURE TO DRIVE 
INTERNAL COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING. 
 
The best method for dealing with Dodd-Frank is for organizations 
to move past focusing only on the formal aspects of the structure of their 
compliance programs, and to integrate their ethics and compliance 
programs into the fabric of their organizational culture.205 As with so 
many things in life, this is easier said than done. Attorneys and 
compliance professionals tend to focus on “check-the-box” requirements 
in drafting and designing internal compliance programs, focusing more 
on strict legal requirements rather than on the organizational 
implications and efficacy of the program.206 But changing the 
                                                                                                                                         
 203. See Krawiec, supra note 107, at 491. 
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organizational culture is much more difficult than simply drafting a new 
policy or implementing a new process. By understanding what drives 
ethical behavior of employees in organizations, attorneys and other 
compliance professionals can implement compliance processes and 
interact with organizational constituents in a way that will maximize the 
opportunity to develop a culture of ethical decision-making and internal 
reporting. 
 
1. Focus on Management Commitment,  
       Communication and Congruency 
 
Research shows that organizational culture starts from the “tone at 
the top.”207 When the CEO and other high-level managers do not express 
a commitment to ethics and are uninvolved in compliance programs, the 
compliance programs are less likely to have an effect on employee 
behavior.208 
However, it is not enough for management to simply express a 
commitment to compliance—the commitment must be visible and there 
must be effective communication of this commitment between the 
employees and management.209 High-level managers tend to self-
identify closely with their organization, and thus often have a more 
sanguine view of the ethical climate than do lower-level employees 
working inV the trenches.210 Additionally, top managers often do not 
communicate frequently with lower-level managers, and vice-versa.211 
This two-way lack of communication can create problems. For example, 
a CEO may have a commitment to ethical behavior and compliance, but 
this commitment is not communicated to the employees adequately, and 
is not visible to them. Conversely, lower level employees may know of 
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 210. Id. at 1208. 
 211. Id. 
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unethical or unlawful practices that the company is engaged in while 
upper-level management naively believes everything is fine.212 
In addition to the importance of communication, a recent study 
found that when there is a high level of congruency in senior 
management, employees are more likely to call an internal 
whistleblowing hotline, and less likely to blow the whistle externally. 213 
Thus, it is important that employees not only have a commitment to 
ethics communicated to them by management, but that top management 
communicate and display their behavior in accordance with the ethical 
norms of the company. 
Of course, attorneys and other compliance professionals are limited 
in their ability to control management or influence it to behave in an 
ethical manner or communicate their values. Nevertheless, compliance 
programs can be structured such that communication channels regarding 
organizational ethics allow for the flow of information as easily as 
possible from the top down, and from the bottom up, on a regular basis. 
Most internal compliance programs focus on formal communication 
channels, such as hotlines or internal reporting procedures, while 
informal communications channels are often viewed as ineffective.214 
Formal communication channels are important, however, informal 
communications can also be critical in encouraging employees to report 
wrongdoing.215 Compliance managers should encourage management to 
utilize informal methods of communication to engage in discussion and 
dialogue on ethics throughout the organization. 
Managers can increase their influence and learn by engaging 
employees at all levels in informal dialogue on ethics and compliance 
issues and taking advantage of the speed of informal information 
flow.216 Informal, low-pressure communications can also be much less 
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stressful to employees, freeing them up to discuss issues more openly. 217 
Informal communications can also convey, in a very sincere and 
tangible manner, management’s commitment to running an ethical 
organization, and show how management structures their own conduct 
in adherence to the organization’s ethical norms.218 Additionally, 
engaging in this type of dialogue before a violation is reported through 
formal compliance mechanisms increases the likelihood that a potential 
legal or ethical violation can be remedied before it occurs or grows into 
a larger or more widespread problem. 
 
2. Integrate Compliance Functions  
       into Daily Business Practices 
 
As noted by Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, formal compliance 
programs can become easily decoupled from regular business affairs, 
rendering them ineffective.219 Thus, in designing and implementing an 
internal compliance program, care needs to be taken that the program is 
integrated into the organization’s ongoing business affairs such that it 
becomes an integral part of the organization’s identity and operations. In 
this way, employees can be pushed to consider ethical and legal 
ramifications as part of the standard decision-making process when 
carrying out business functions. 
An example of such an integrated policy, provided by Weaver, 
Trevino, & Cochran, is a health care products company they examined. 
The company made one-third of every manager’s annual raise 
dependent upon how well the manager carried out ethical ideals, as 
evaluated by superiors, peers, and subordinates.220 Such a policy helps 
ensure that managers are considering ethics and compliance issues when 
making decisions—their livelihood depends on it. In order to be 
effective, integration need not be this formal, however. For example, 
informal discussions with employees when making decisions can spur 
employees to integrate ethics into their decision-making processes. A 
routine dialogue of simple questions such as “How will this decision 
affect the environment?”; How will this decision affect how the public 
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thinks about our company?”; “Is this legal? Even if it is, is it right?”; or 
“Am I proud of this decision? Would I be ashamed if my friends or 
family knew about it?”, can help build ethical norms within an 
organization.221 When employees know that the company culture 
requires them to justify decisions along ethical dimensions as well as 
more traditional business metrics, they will be more likely to 
instinctually integrate these considerations into their thought processes. 
CONCLUSION 
The 2008 financial crisis created broad societal costs, some of 
which stemmed from corporate fraud and malfeasance.222 The Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission formed by Congress determined that the 
crisis was avoidable, and had strong criticisms for lax government 
regulators.223 While a failure of government regulation should shoulder 
some of the blame of the crisis, the individuals and organizations who 
were the primary actors should shoulder the most. Apparently, the 
“strong compliance systems set up under Sarbanes Oxley”224 by 
companies were not able to prevent the behavior that led to this crisis. In 
light of these failures and lack of strong evidence that internal 
compliance programs are effective in deterring illegal conduct,225 the 
criticisms that the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank will 
undermine internal compliance programs ring hollow. 
Rather, as laid out in this Article, evidence indicates that the 
whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank have the potential to serve as 
an incentive for companies to more effectively implement and enforce 
their internal compliance programs and attempt to build more ethical 
cultures.226 Internal compliance programs are an important regulatory 
mechanism that can benefit both the organizations that utilize them and 
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society. However, like any regulatory framework, incentivizing internal 
compliance has the potential for abuse. The whistleblower provisions of 
Dodd-Frank provide a much-needed check on this potential for abuse, 
while still respecting the valuable role that internal compliance 
programs can serve. 
